Cryptographic Primitive Misuse in Production Signing Infrastructure
A large-scale study of ECDSA misuse in production DeFi signing infrastructure, extending the weak-entropy lineage of MilkSad and the nonce-relation analysis of Kudelski’s Polynonce research. Using a corpus of more than four billion signatures, with emphasis on 0x01 ecrecover precompile flows, this work examines how latency pressure turns signing from a cryptographic operation into a performance target. The thesis: the teams closest to DeFi’s execution frontier are often the most tempted to optimize away the assumptions ECDSA depends on. MEV searchers, builders, relayers, and market makers are especially exposed because signing sits directly in the hot path: nonce generation, batching, sharding, caching, and signer orchestration become targets for micro-optimization. These choices may not produce obvious duplicate nonces, but they can introduce weak correlations, bias, or partial leakage at exactly the scale where advances in lattice sieving and Fourier-analytic detection techniques become relevant. The result is a shifting failure boundary: signatures that looked merely “non-ideal” under yesterday’s analysis may become exploitable under tomorrow’s cryptanalysis.